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THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
Johannes M. Bauer
Abstract: The paper reviews the historical transformation of the European regulatory frame-
work for electronic communications from the era dominated by state-owned enterprises to the 
presence of regulated competition. In the course of these developments, the vision of the roles 
of the public and private sectors in electronic communications changed in expected and unex-
pected ways. While the period is characterized by a shift toward less direct state intervention, 
the intensity of regulation has increased in many areas. Most recently, in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis, new forms of state intervention can be observed, including public investment in 
communications infrastructure and public-private partnerships. As a result of the reforms, Eu-
rope has been able to achieve major successes but it also suffered unanticipated setbacks com-
pared to other regions. The European Union emerged as the global leader in mobile communi-
cations during the 1990s and was able to roll-out first-generation broadband access networks 
more rapidly than many of its peers. Recently, however, Europe as a whole has not performed 
as well in deploying next-generation networks and advanced mobile communications servic-
es. The paper offers a political-economic explanation for these developments and assesses their 
effects on the performance of the European electronic communications sector and the economy. 
From this analysis, the European model emerges as a unique institutional arrangement with 
peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Once these are recognized, sensible next steps to build 
the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of the model can be seen more clearly.
Keywords: European Union, Regulatory Reform, Broadband, Next-Generation Networks, In-
vestment, Innovation, Adaptive Regulation.
Comments: Paper presented at the IBEI-CEPAL international seminar “Innovación y regu-
lación en las TIC.Una perspectiva comparada entre Europa y América Latina”. Barcelona, 30 
September – 1 October 2013.
20
13
/4
1 
· I
BE
I W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s -
 T
el
ef
on
ic
a C
ha
ir 
Se
rie
s
1. INTRODUCTION
 During the past decades, Europe has made remarkable progress in transform-
ing its electronic communications sector and improving its performance. For much 
of the twentieth century Europe overall lagged behind the U.S. in the availability of 
electronic communication infrastructure, the cost of services, and the innovative dy-
namics of the sector, especially new forms of data communications and the early In-
ternet. Admittedly, such broad perspectives do incomplete justice to the considerable 
variance at the subnational level. In Europe, the Nordic countries typically achieved 
very high performance and in the U.S. considerable regional differences prevailed. 
Due to a combination of enlightened policy and serendipity, this high-level picture 
changed quite significantly toward the end of the millennium. 
 
 In the 1990s, the European Union (EU) snatched the lead in mobile commu-
nications from the U.S. after it adopted a Europe-wide standard (GSM) that allowed 
overcoming the historical fragmentation of wireless communications. Manufactur-
ers, network operators, and users benefited from economies of scale and unified com-
munications throughout Europe. As a result of the long-term effects of regulatory re-
forms initiated in the late 1980s, Europe was able to close the gap in broadband access 
to peer nations. By 2006, the number of broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants in 
the EU-15 matched the American adoption rate, with several member states boasting 
better performance than the U.S.
 
 But, somehow surprisingly, this picture changed again as more advanced gen-
erations of electronic communications emerged. Europe lost its leadership in wireless 
communications to South Korea and Japan, who emerged as leaders in mobile Inter-
net technology, typically referred to as third-generation (3G) and later fourth-genera-
tion (4G) mobile. Japan and South Korea also promoted next-generation fixed broad-
band technology very aggressively and took the global lead in fiber connectivity, seen 
by many as a critical platform for future digital innovation. In this global change of 
leadership, the U.S. regained some momentum in the fourth generation of wireless 
services (4G) and it has improved its position in fixed next-generation infrastructure 
availability and performance. Again, within this broader development, the observa-
ble patterns are rather diverse and varied.
 
 These shifts happened despite ambitious goals and programs developed by 
the European Union. In the Lisbon Agenda, adopted in 2000, Europe sought to be-
come the “most competitive and the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world” by 2010. Although the purpose of defining a shared policy agenda and a 
framework for the advancement of broadband was achieved, by the time of its mid-
term review it was apparent that most of the broader goals would not be realized, as 
many of the fundamental assumptions about the digital economy had changed. Con-
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sequently, the Union in its revised strategy (i2010) refocused on achieving sustainable 
economic growth and low unemployment by 2010. Many of the earlier goals became 
embedded in the Digital Agenda for Europe, one of the seven flagship initiatives 
within the Europe 2020 ten-year growth program.1
 This paper seeks to explain these observations. Several factors are at work 
and need to be woven together. Not all of them can effectively be controlled or influ-
enced by national and European policy makers. In that sense they are fully or partial-
ly external to the policy system. Among these factors are changes in the global organ-
ization of production, the slowdown of economic growth in high-income countries, 
and the accelerating changes in the technological base of media and communications 
industries. Other contributing forces are the outcome of earlier policy decisions and 
the ensuing institutional maturation process. Some of the arrangements implement-
ed since the 1970s seem to have reached the end of their lifecycle and may need fur-
ther adaptation to changing economic, political, and technological circumstances. In 
a sense these a self-made constraints, even though there may be considerable inertia 
and resistance to modifying them. Last but not least, there is an increasing mismatch 
between the working of the socio-technical system media and communications and 
the way policy intervention is construed and implemented. We will address these 
factors throughout the paper.
 
 A closer look at the empirical evidence reveals a much more nuanced and dif-
ferentiated picture that is not visible when looking at the EU as a whole. There con-
tinues to be considerable variance within the member states of the European Union. 
Both traditional leaders such as the Nordic countries and new member states have 
achieved outstanding track records, adapting better to changing conditions than oth-
ers. Often, these are driven by initiatives at the sub-national level, such as public-pri-
vate partnerships involving municipalities and industry. This suggests that to under-
stand the diversity and complexity of developments in advanced communications, 
it is necessary to look at multiple levels (local, national, European, global) and their 
interactions. Moreover, a critical analysis of these developments will benefit from 
taking broader changes in digital communications and its governance into account. 
One force is the emergence of the Internet as a unifying platform with a governance 
model largely built around networks and self-regulation that is quite different from 
the more hierarchical regulatory model of traditional telecommunications. Another 
is the need to find frameworks that support additional investment and innovation, 
two goals that were historically seen as automatic consequences of liberalization and 
sector reform. While this perspective is not entirely wrong, recent experience sug-
gests that large-scale investment and innovation require complementary institution-
al arrangements that do not emerge from repeated market interactions alone.
 
-5-
1.     See http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/digital-agenda-europe.
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 The paper addresses these issues by starting with a succinct overview of the 
historical path of European communications regulation and policy. It continues with 
a discussion of the unique features of the European model and its strengths and 
weaknesses. Section four links technological, economic, and political developments 
in a co-evolutionary framework that can help shed light on the specific European 
experience. Lessons for public policy will be drawn in section five before the main 
points are reiterated in the conclusions.
2. THE TRANSFORMATION FROM STATE OWN-
ERSHIP TO REGULATED COMPETITION 
 
 The history of European electronic communications reform has been told 
many times so that it is not necessary to recap it in detail (Belloc, Nicita, & Parcu, 
2013; de Streel, 2008; Eliassen & Sjovaag, 1999; Michalis, 2006; Noam, 1992; Thatcher, 
2002). Nonetheless, it may be helpful to highlight a few main aspects as they contrib-
ute to a fuller understanding of the recent developments. For much of the twentieth 
century, European electronic communications was organized around state-owned 
posts, telephone, and telegraph service providers (PTTs. However, a broad variety 
of approaches existed within this broader organizational framework (Foreman-Peck 
& Müller, 1988; Noam, 1992). Whereas in most countries national state-owned mo-
nopolies prevailed, in very few cases the main network operators were jointly owned 
by public and private owners (e.g., Italy. In some countries the sector was organized 
along services (e.g., Italy, where local, long distance, and satellite services were pro-
vided by separate entities) and in others by regions (e.g., Finland, where more than 
50 municipal network operators were integrated by a national company. Moreover, 
interactions between network operators and equipment manufacturers differed, al-
though there was a recurring pattern of close collaboration between the national elec-
tronics industry and service providers.
 These arrangements started to destabilize beginning in the 1970s due to the 
confluence of intellectual, political, technical, economic, and social developments. 
Among intellectuals and practitioners new views of the main drivers of economic 
growth and prosperity were discussed that attributed central importance to informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) (Bell, 1973; Toffler, 1980). Among Europe-
an decision-makers, a view took hold that the continent was falling behind peer na-
tions in these critical technologies (Nora & Minc, 1978). At the same time, traditional 
policies of state intervention in the economy that had served many nations well in 
the post-World War II period were not able to prevent a period of stagflation (a com-
bination of stagnation and inflation. Consequently, trust in the ability of government 
to steer the economy was fading and new political forces advocating a smaller role of 
-6-
government in the economy gained ground worldwide. Given poor macroeconomic 
performance, public finances were strained and limited allocation of public funds 
to large-scale network infrastructure projects at a time when the ICT sector needed 
massive investment in infrastructure. Slowly, a new blueprint based on liberalized 
markets, reduced state ownership, and independent regulation was accepted as a 
superior solution. Such sector organization was widely deemed as one of the reasons 
why the U.S. communications industry was more innovative and dynamic than its 
European counterparts. A third component were technological and economic chang-
es that created demand-side and supply-side pressure for reform. Large users were 
eager to take advantage of new forms of data communications but the prevailing mo-
nopolistic structures were slow in introducing innovations and in responding to their 
needs. Major supplier industries also were seeking economies of scale that could not 
be realized in national markets any longer.
 Taken together, these forces created policy disequilibrium and an opportuni-
ty to change the status quo. Reforms started at the level of individual nation states, 
with Sweden and the U.K. among the pioneers. More sweeping changes were in-
itiated when the European Commission (EC) became a promoter of sector reform 
in the 1980s. Acting somewhat removed from national coalitions of interest, poli-
cy-makers in Brussels developed a vision, expressed in the Green Paper on Tele-
communications, of a pan-European electronic communications sector that would 
overcome the “patchwork Europe” and launch the European ICT sector as well as the 
European economy into a new age of prosperity. As in the American reform process, 
the momentum generated at a higher level in the policy system was critical to get 
the reform process moving and forge consensus visions that could be implement-
ed. In a series of directives, the European Commission (EC) proceeded to introduce 
measures that successively liberalized terminal equipment, value-added and other 
services, until eventually, in 1998 all services and networks were opened to com-
petition (Bance, 2007; Belloc et al., 2013; M. E. Cave & Valletti, 2000; Jordana, 2002; 
Thatcher, 1999). The EU realized in a little more than a decade a program that had 
taken the U.S. nearly four decades to develop and implement, not a small feat. As 
part of the transformation, new independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
were to be established. However, no consensus could be found to establish a Euro-
pean regulatory agency. Coordination at that level was orchestrated among national 
regulators, initially in the European Regulators Group (ERG) and now in the Body of 
European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC. Given the sensitivity 
of the issue, the Commission did not issue any directive requiring privatization of 
the network operator, although each incumbent had to succumb to the new regula-
tory regime. Most EU member states adopted policies of privatization, but more or 
less significant public stakes in the incumbent were retained. In 2012, Luxembourg 
was the only member stat that had retained full state ownership in Entreprise des 
Postes et Télécommunication, whereas seven member states, including Spain, Ita-
ly, and the Netherlands, had sold all shares to private owners. However, in some 
case, such as the Netherlands, the public sector kept a golden share that could veto 
-7-
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important management decisions. This led to the paradoxical situation that fully or 
partially state-owned operators became subject to state regulation, an institutional 
model with many potential conflicts of interest and incentive problems (Bauer, 2005; 
Edwards & Waverman, 2006).
 The reforms implemented interacted with technological, economic, and po-
litical forces to generate a virtuous cycle of investment, increased competition, price 
declines, and accelerated adoption. During much of the twentieth century, the EU 
trailed the US in terms of fixed lines per 100 inhabitants. Given the rapid expansion 
of mobile communications in the EU, by 1997 the EU-15 could boast more access 
paths (fixed and mobile access lines) per 100 inhabitants than the US and by 2002 the 
EU-28 surpassed the US.2  In fixed wired broadband access lines, a similar picture of 
a narrowing gap is observable for the EU-15 region. Although the broadband trajec-
tory of the two regions is more similar than in voice access lines, the US led the EU-15 
until 2006, when the EU surpassed the EU-15 region. Because of the lower income 
Figure 1: Access paths (fixed and mobile access lines) per 100 inhabitants 1970-2010.
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicator Database
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2.     A note of caution is in order, as European data count SIM cards and not necessarily subscribers. Due to the prevalence of multiple SIM cards, EU data  
        likely overstate the diffusion of mobile service.
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Figure 2: Fixed (wired) broadband access lines per 100 inhabitants 1998-2010.
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicator Database
and different political and regulatory conditions in the new member states, the pic-
ture differs with regard to the EU-28, which continues to lag behind the US, despite 
an overall similar adoption pattern.3 Finally, in a cross-national comparison, several 
European member states had reached higher broadband adoption by 2010.4
-9-
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3.     Again, great caution is in order when comparing numbers across countries and regions. Fixed broadband is typically subscribed by households or firms           
        and not on an individual basis. In as far as there is variation in household sizes, a comparison of per capita values is biased (Bennett, Stewart, & Atkinson,    
        2013; Wallsten, 2008).
4.    However, this picture also would change dramatically if one were to look at US states rather than the US. If a comparison were performed at that level of   
       granularity, several US states, including the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts would be among the top ten. In 2008, seven 
       of the top ten performers were US states and three EU member states (Bauer, 2008).
Figure 3: Broadband adoption in the EU-15 and the US 2010.
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicator Database
 The overall regulatory framework was periodically reviewed for its consist-
ency and compatibility with the state of technology and uses. A first major overhaul 
took place in 2003 and another one in 2007. In the most recent review, the realm of 
regulation was reduced to fewer submarkets, although the intensity of the remain-
ing regulations gradually increased across most of Europe (Zenhäusern & Schneider, 
2012; Zenhäusern, Schneider, Berner, & Vaterlaus, 2012). These reforms unleashed 
efficiency gains and a new dynamic in the European telecommunications industry, 
particularly during the early years of restructuring.
 Prices declined rapidly, the variety and diversity of equipment and services 
increased greatly, and the adoption of services was boosted. Users started to bypass 
the fixed network, relying increasingly on mobile services. In the business market 
segments, new service providers started to offer a broadening array of options. More-
over, during the late 1990s the European approach with its stronger role for govern-
ment became a blueprint for many middle and low-income countries. Nonetheless, 
the luster of the European model started to fade away in the past few years. A key 
problem of many countries and of the EU overall is that the policy approach was 
more successful in squeezing efficiencies out of the existing system than to stimu-
late the transition to the next generation of infrastructures and services, which re-
quire considerable investment in infrastructure. This is not equally important across 
all of Europe, as several nations, including Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
managed to overcome this challenge with innovative policies and public-private sec-
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tor cooperation. Nonetheless, the lack of network investment is a serious problem 
to which currently no clear solution is in sight. The EU has sought to address these 
challenges in a series of recent policy documents, including the recommendations for 
next-generation networks (M. E. Cave & Shortall, 2011; EC, 2010). At the same time, 
the Union announced cutting subsidies for broadband networks as part of fiscal aus-
terity measures, thus sending mixed signals to the market participants.
3. UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES OF THE  EUROPEAN MODEL
 Compared to other parts of the world, the European model has several unique 
attributes that help explain its overall dynamics. Among the notable features of the 
European approach are:
    An opportunity to design regulatory institutions, building on the historical expe-
rience elsewhere.
    A stronger integration of regulation with principles of competition law and 
    economics.
   A framework conducive to the fusion and further integration of media and infor-
mation industries.
   An openness to realize synergies between the public and the private sector.
   Continued economic, political, and cultural heterogeneity.
   A relatively weak presence in computing and other key technologies.
 We will discuss these aspects briefly in the following subsections.
 
3.1 An Opportunity for Informed Institutional Innovation
 Opportunities to design and implement a new framework for entire indus-
tries in a more radical fashion arise infrequently in history. There is considerable evi-
dence that institutional change follows a pattern in which periods of gradual adapta-
tion are punctuated by periods of more rapid change. Such windows of opportunity 
arise if problem pressure has built up and a sufficient number of stakeholders share 
a vision of an alternative set of policies so that change is feasible and not blocked by 
veto players (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Tsebelis, 2002). In Europe, the perception 
that the historical monopoly organization of the sector was not well suited to the new 
technological opportunities was growing in the 1970s. The report by Nora and Minc 
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(1978) to French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, which carefully documented 
the increasing importance of the integration of telecommunications and computing 
(termed “telematics”) was widely read and solidified the notion that Europe was lag-
ging behind its competitors in global markets. The authors proposed new national 
policies to harness the innovative power of telematics, a perspective that influenced 
important research and development programs initiated at the national level and ear-
ly European programs launched by Brussels, including the European Strategic Pro-
gramme for Research in Information Technologies (ESPRIT), the R&D in Advanced 
Communications Technologies for Europe (RACE), and many more initiatives (see 
the detailed discussion in Ungerer, 1988).
 However, gradually the architects of free and open markets prevailed and 
by the time the Green Paper on Telecommunications was released the policy blue-
print had changed to a model embracing liberalization with industrial policy as a 
complementary form of public intervention (EC, 1987). A key problem was seen in 
the fragmentation of the European information industries into national markets, 
technological standards, and business models (what was later termed the “Cost of 
Non-Europe”. Given the long history of monopolistic sector organization, it was clear 
that any transformation would take considerable time and effort and could only be 
achieved with the help of independent oversight (Jordana, 2002; Majone, 1996a, 2001, 
1996b). The only institutional alternative available to the public enterprise model 
was independent regulation by a government or government-licensed body, as had 
been the case in North America since the late nineteenth century. At the time Europe 
considered liberalization, the North American regulatory model, which had evolved 
over many decades, was under attack by multiple stakeholders as overly bureaucrat-
ic and captured by special interest groups (Becker, 1983; Owen & Braeutigam, 1978; 
Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971), a discussion that can be traced back to the 1940s (Phil-
lips, 1993). Eventually, beginning in the 1950s, a very slow and incremental process 
of regulatory reform and deregulation had been set into motion by courts, regulatory 
agencies, and legislators and had resulted in numerous deregulatory and re-regula-
tory measures. 
 This experience could be taken into account when European policy-makers, 
advised by consultants and scholars, worked out a new sector model (Bauer, 2010a; 
Majone, 1991; Vogelsang, 2003). The U.S. model of regulation could not easily be 
implemented in the statutory legal systems of continental Europe but eventually 
solutions were devised, often leading to the creation of special private sector bod-
ies. Europe faced other constraints that shaped the outcome of the regulatory setup. 
Member states were not willing to delegate regulatory powers over industries seen 
as crucial for their prosperity and political systems to a European agency, resulting in 
a decentralized system of now 28 national regulators coordinated by directives and 
other policy measures from Brussels. Over time, informal mechanisms of coordina-
tion between the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) emerged. 
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 During the early years, there was also a shortfall of experts trained in regula-
tion. Consequently, the early regulatory bodies were small and followed pragmatic, 
streamlined procedures. However, as agencies matured this changed as the novel 
agencies evolved in a life-cycle that was not unlike that which had plagued their 
North American counterparts (Goldberg, 1976): the number of stakeholders with po-
tentially conflicting interests increased with the opening of markets to new entrants, 
the number of experts in consulting, law firms, and interest associations expanded, 
and the regulatory issues became more complicated. Whereas regulation initially was 
a force for change, it increasingly became bogged down by bureaucracy, intervention 
into detail and intractable conflicts of interest. As in other countries, such processes 
of calcification can be counteracted by regulatory reform, which is currently consid-
ered all across Europe.
3.2 An Integrated and Overarching Framework
 A second important difference of the European approach relates to the con-
ceptual foundations used in addressing regulatory problems. European telecommu-
nications policy had been informed by normative models of the role of the state in the 
economy. Telecommunications service providers were in most countries among the 
largest employers and investors and hence provided government leverage to pursue 
economic goals (Nowotny, 1982). State actions were informed by two largely incom-
patible conceptual frameworks: on the one hand a pragmatic theory of the social 
economy that envisioned public enterprises as instruments of public policy (Thie-
meyer, 1983). This approach had many similarities to the early institutional econom-
ic that informed and shaped early public utility regulation in North America (Bauer, 
2003). On the other hand, public enterprise management was informed by the ne-
oclassical theory of optimal public enterprise decisions (Bös, 1981). This approach 
was closely related to the neoclassical theory or optimal regulation, which was the 
dominant paradigm in North American regulation when Europe redesigned its ap-
proach. In contrast to the earlier vision of regulation, neoclassical theory narrowly 
construed regulation as a response to market failure, most importantly to market 
power, externalities, and public goods (Berg & Tschirhart, 1988; Laffont & Tirole, 
2000; Spulber, 1989; Train, 1991). Moreover, like the older approach it used a static 
equilibrium model to design optimal intervention. As this approach was seen as the 
best practice of regulation both by practitioners and academics, European regula-
tion widely adopted it. However, the European approach deviated in one important 
aspect from its North American counterpart by integrating sector regulation with 
principles of competition law and antitrust economics (Marcus, 2003). 
 Only market segments in which competition is deemed to be insufficient 
can be subject to ex ante regulation. Over time, elaborate joint processes emerged, 
-13-
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involving NRAs and the European Commission, to test for the presence of significant 
market power (SMP), either by a single firm or by several firms jointly (de Streel, 
2003, 2008; EC, 2002; Kiessling & Blondeel, 1998). Both actual market structure and 
market entry conditions are part of the test. This approach resulted in a framework 
whereby relevant markets had to be defined in a collaborative process but it also al-
lowed responding to national and even local conditions. In 2003, 18 retail and whole-
sale markets had been identified in which ex ante regulation was seen as appropriate 
because of the prevalence of significant market power (EC, 2003). In its 2007 review, 
the Commission reduced the number of relevant markets to seven, one retail and six 
wholesale markets (EC, 2007; Tintor, Jankovic, & Milicevic, 2010). The tacit concep-
tual framework underlying this approach is that competition is superior to regula-
tion and that regulation is a stopgap to avoid the abuse of market power. This is a 
far-cry from the model that had prevailed before, which saw collaboration between 
the public and the private sector as an integral part of overcoming the challenges 
of infrastructure provision at an affordable level and in a ubiquitous manner across 
space and demographics. This alignment between antitrust and regulation resulted 
in a more coherent and elegant approach. In practice, the outcomes are roughly com-
parable to the policies adopted in the more complicated U.S. system (Marcus, 2003, 
2005). However, the model ran into difficulties of another kind. Regulatory practices 
were refined in a context of opening existing networks to competitors. The static eco-
nomic equilibrium approach was a sufficiently accurate approximation to address 
these issues. However, it started to backfire when the problem situation shifted to 
needing to find a new dynamic balance between investment, innovation, and the 
goal of supporting new entrants and new incumbent players.
 Another aspect of the integrated approach pursued in Europe is the explicit 
attention paid to convergence of media and telecommunication market segments 
(EC, 1997). The notion of convergence is a much stronger guiding vision for policy in 
Europe and in Asia than in the U.S., where a broader view prevails that recognizes 
that there are several other trajectories of change (e.g., divergence, differentiation, 
fusion. The EU made a concerted effort to design a framework that is most condu-
cive to these transformational forms of innovation. Although a full discussion would 
exceed the scope of this paper, it should be mentioned that the principles of tech-
nological neutrality, competitive neutrality, and provider neutrality that underpin 
European policy ease many boundary conflicts that continue to affect the American 
policy discourse. Moreover, the potential for innovation embedded in a converged 
media sector is inspiring a main thrust within the Digital Agenda 2020 (EC, 2013).
3.3 The State as a Contributor Rather than a Mere Stopgap
 A third aspect of the European model is the continued belief that the public 
sector can fulfill important roles by intervening in a more discretionary fashion via 
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taxes, subsidies, and public procurement. This is met with a high degree of skepti-
cism by some players in Europe and across the Atlantic. However, the effects of in-
stitutional arrangements on performance are more complicated than often assumed 
and the capability of the public sector to intervene successfully in high-technology 
industries varies considerably across nations. This implies that the interaction be-
tween public and private players can unfold in many different ways with examples 
of success and failure not necessarily allowing straightforward identification of best 
practice models (Bauer, 2013; Belloc, Nicita, & Rossi, 2012). The EU has a long track 
record of industrial policy programs even though their effects are often disputed. 
Some of the large-scale recent initiatives in ICT, such as the Lisbon Agenda and i2010 
have had rather disappointing overall outcomes. However, in such an assessment 
one has to keep in mind that the overall economic conditions changed greatly ren-
dering an evaluation of the program nearly impossible. 
 In theory, a public sector organization could be a vehicle to internalize types 
of market failure that are not directly related to market power, such as the wide-
spread spillover effects of advanced information infrastructure many of which con-
stitute externalities or have public good character (Frischmann, 2012). This was one 
of the rationales of public enterprises to begin with although the practical implemen-
tation often fell short of the vision. In the new environment based on a competitive 
market vision, there are potential tensions between these forms of state intervention 
and the goal of safeguarding a level competitive playing field. The European Com-
mission has sought to address this tension with its state aid policy although this often 
results in constraints that may prevent the design of effective policies (Gomez-Barro-
so & Feijoo, 2012). The willingness to experiment with innovative partnerships has, 
to some degree, helped overcome the deficiencies in market-driven network infra-
structure investment that has been plaguing Europe as a result of policies that failed 
to explicitly consider investment effects of regulation (Falch & Henten, 2010; Ser-
entschy, 2013). In countries where such experiments are widespread such as Sweden, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands, broadband deployment and investment in advanced 
network infrastructure has been robust. While these pragmatic models seem to work 
in small high-income countries, it is doubtful whether they can easily be migrated to 
other nations. 
 There is another interesting aspect to this continued willingness to use the 
ability of the public sector to intervene in ways that are different from other agents 
that might provide an advantage to Europe in critical areas of innovation. Much 
of the recent discussion has focused on the app economy with its very high inno-
vation dynamics (West & Mace, 2010). However, innovation in the ICT ecosystem 
takes place in different forms and processes. Some are facilitated by open network 
architectures and competition but others require coordination among large numbers 
of stakeholders. Such coupled innovations are often risky and their benefits occur 
in the form of public or club goods. Consequently, in a market-driven environment 
-15-
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they may not happen unless an actor is willing to facilitate coordination among the 
players. Examples of such types of innovation are mobile Internet services and large-
scale systems such as electronic health cards. The case of the mobile Internet illus-
trates that the requisite coordination functions can be assumed by private industry 
(e.g., NTT DoCoMo in Japan, SK Telecom in South Korea, and with great delay Apple 
in the US) but in the case of health IT thus far no such blueprint for coordination 
has emerged. Only countries where government has convened and orchestrated the 
relevant stakeholders, including the medical profession, insurance companies, the 
pharmaceutical industry, has the technology taken off (e.g., in Germany, Switzer-
land. From this vantage point, the European cultural and political framework may 
position the region well for important systemic innovations that have the potential 
to greatly transform how we live and work.
3.4 Challenges and Advantages of Cultural, Political and Economic Het-
erogeneity
 A fourth aspect is the continued economic, political, and cultural heteroge-
neity across Europe. While overcoming it was one of the stated goals of European 
economic and political integration, some degree of diversity is not necessarily nega-
tive. A key question therefore is how integration and differentiation can and should 
be balanced. That diversity can be advantageous is often overlooked or poorly un-
derstood. It appears in a rather different light once seen in the context of governing 
the dynamic development and complexity of the information and communication 
system. Evolutionary strands of innovation theory have pointed out for some time 
that invention and innovation typically are new combinations and re-combinations 
of existing technological, economic, or organizational knowledge. Innovation and 
investment decisions, which in the technologically dynamic ICT system are closely 
related, take place under uncertainty. At the time an innovation decision is made (a 
new combination is tried out), it is usually not known whether it will be accepted 
by users and succeed in the marketplace. If different innovators explore different 
re-combinations, the chances that one or more will succeed are increased. This was 
already pointed out by Hayek in his metaphor of competition (in the sense of rivalry 
among firms) as a “discovery procedure” (of both things that work and those that do 
not) (Hayek, 1968, 2002). One could argue that in a complex adaptive system with 
many interdependencies and non-linear interactions conditions for success are fur-
ther complicated and the value of experimentation enhanced.
 A similar argument can be made for policy diversity and institutional diversi-
ty. In a dynamic, complex adaptive system such as ICT, policy interventions also take 
place under a considerable degree of uncertainty. Although this is rarely admitted 
by decision-makers for fear that it would undermine the decisiveness and ability to 
steer the system, many policies are “real world experiments” whose outcomes are 
not known with certainty. This insight has led Bunge (1979) to caution against large-
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scale systemic interventions and to point out the advantages of controlled, more local 
experiments that can help learning about the consequences of new policies. Insti-
tutional diversity and local differences can help improve our understanding of the 
potential effects of policies and in sorting out measures and combinations of meas-
ures that work from those that do not. If initially used locally or at a national level, 
others can learn and adapt their policies and institutional arrangements accordingly. 
Often, this will be a process of amalgamation and adaption rather than direct cop-
ying (Bauer, 2010a). Scholars in political science and law have similarly recognized 
that local experimentation can be helpful. Teske (1990, 1995) has studied the benefits 
of the decentralized, two-tier structure of the U.S. system of regulation. States serve 
as laboratories for policies that serve to inspire others and, in some case that prove 
to be clearly successful, are synchronized and coordinated by federal agencies to 
be implemented nation-wide. In a similar vein, Cherry (2007) has pointed out that 
federal agencies or policy coordinators can serve as a “patching mechanism” that 
can help overcome a collective action problem of reaching superior policies that are 
beyond the reach of local adaptations. Most recently, Sabel & Zeitlin (2010) analyzed 
the “experimentalist” nature of the European governance approach, identifying the 
interaction between member states and the European-level organizations as a system 
that facilitated policy learning and adaptation.
3.5 Presence and Experience in Key Technologies
 A final, fifth, point that deserves mentioning is the relatively weak presence 
of European firms in key technologies that are powering advanced communications. 
Several waves of technological change have contributed to a closer integration and 
fusion between computing, media, and communication industries. During the 1960s, 
new combinations of computing and telecommunications functions spawned inno-
vations in data communications, telematics services, and the emergence of a new 
communications architecture and platform, the Internet. Subsequently, advances in 
signal representation and processing enabled digital audio and video and the dif-
fusion of fixed and mobile broadband networks in combination with new network 
architectures (e.g., content delivery networks, cloud computing) further expanded 
the space of innovation opportunities. Referring to the integration of telematics and 
media, some authors referred to the converging world of media and telecommuni-
cations as “mediamatics” (Latzer, 1997). While widely used, the term convergence 
obfuscates the various developments that unfold: the technological integration driv-
en by digitization, advances in computing, and broadband networking and the par-
allel differentiation and fragmentation into numerous new services and applications 
(Greenstein & Khanna, 1997). 
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 The more complicated value net of advanced communication services resem-
bles the value net of computing services. Modularity, layering and plasticity of the 
technological base create unique conditions for success. European firms do not hold 
a strong position in these areas so that much of the momentum is now located in 
the U.S. and in Asia, which has quickly caught up to America (Falch, Henten, & 
Vandrup, 2010). At the same time, once leading European technology firms such as 
Nokia, have fallen way behind their international competitors.
4. GOVERNING THE SOCIO TECHNICAL SYS-
TEM ICT
 Before we can attempt a comprehensive explanation of the patterns report-
ed in section two, a deeper look at the fundamental challenges of governing a dy-
namic socio technical system such as ICT is required. The overall conditions of high 
performance in electronic communications have changed quite substantially since 
the era of monopoly provision. We will argue in this section that the intellectual 
and practical foundations of regulation have not fully made this transition, leaving 
a potential mismatch between the working of the system to be governed and the 
design and implementation of governance (Bauer, 2013). Particularly three areas 
need to be reconsidered. First, regulation would benefit from taking innovation 
explicitly into account. Second, interdependencies among players need to be better 
understood. Third, new initiatives to overcome the inertia and shortcomings of the 
existing regulatory system, to adapt policy to changing circumstances, are needed. 
This includes a higher awareness of the costs and benefits of regulation.
 A first deficit of prevailing regulatory approaches is that they continue to be 
rooted in a static model of the sectors they seek to address. Over the past three dec-
ades, regulatory practices have been designed and refined to address problems of 
market failure and deficiencies in response to national or regional contexts. The in-
stitutional and regulatory reforms put in place since the 1980s have helped unleash 
and accelerate the innovative power of digital technology (Cowhey & Aronson, 
2009; OECD, 2011). However, innovation was seen as a desirable byproduct of in-
creased competition rather than a direct objective that should inform the design of 
regulation. Hence, the legacy of static monopoly regulation continues to reverber-
ate in core aspects, such as the focus on separating monopolistic and competitive 
market segments or the determination of regulated prices based on long-run incre-
mental costs. Future-oriented ICT policy will need to overcome this shortcoming 
and be based explicitly in a dynamic theory of innovation and investment.
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 A focus on investment and innovation requires a new look at the conditions 
of innovation in the ICT system. From an economic point of view, investment and 
innovation decisions are very similar in that both are decisions under uncertainty 
and both require upfront commitment of resources. In the advanced ICT system, 
innovation primarily happens in specific areas and locations of the system, with the 
innovation trajectory of the entire system emerging from these decentralized deci-
sions. Examples of such innovation loci are components (semiconductors, lasers, 
optical fiber) and devices (terminals, routers, servers), assembled and interconnect-
ed in local, regional and global networks. On these networks innovation happens in 
applications (email, P2P, browsers) and services (voice, messaging, search, financial 
transactions. There are many interdependencies between these forms of innova-
tion. For example, the technical characteristics of the network enable and constrain 
the types of applications and services that can be offered. Within this ecosystem, 
the locus of innovation activity has shifted tremendously in response to market 
reforms (Fransman, 2002, 2007, 2010). Whereas historically network operators were 
heavily involved in research and development (R&D), these activities have migrat-
ed to component manufacturers (e.g., Cisco, Intel, Huawei, Nokia), device manu-
facturers (e.g., Apple, Samsung), and technology companies offering applications  
and services (e.g., Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, IBM.
 Innovation thrives in economic environments that reward risk-taking with 
(temporary) super-normal profits. In most industries, but mediated by the econom-
ic and technological peculiarities of a sector, innovation is most vigorous under 
conditions of strong rivalry among competitors. Both too little rivalry (i.e., high mar-
ket concentration) and too much rivalry have negative consequences for the incen-
tive to innovate (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, & Howitt, 2005). Given its origins 
in static equilibrium economics (e.g., the goal to set a price achieved in a perfectly 
competitive market), regulatory theory and practice does not pay sufficient atten-
tion to innovation. This shortcoming is most apparent in policies governing access 
to network elements (e.g., local loops) but also implicit in the recent move toward 
geographically differentiated regulation. In both cases it is not the policy per se but 
often the specific pricing of regulated elements. Increasing awareness of the bias gen-
erated by long-run incremental cost pricing (LRIC) and its variations has resulted in 
new approaches, such as risk-based contracts and network sharing arrangements. 
Whereas these are moves in the right direction, they replace regulatory intervention 
for marketplace innovation, often creating incentives for stakeholders to coopt gov-
ernment agencies as part of their competitive strategies. Moreover, they do not go far 
enough to take the systemic nature of innovation into account (we will come back to 
this point at the end of this section.
 A second area in which current regulatory theory and practice fall short of the 
new reality of ICT markets is the incomplete consideration of the increasing intercon-
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nectedness and interrelatedness of players in the advanced communications system. 
During the age of monopoly regulation (and public monopolies respectively), policy 
makers were able to influence the key aspects of sector performance. In the new open 
market environment, where some of the activities are subject to regulation but many 
others are not, the control span of policy is reduced. Not only can policy not control 
all relevant aspects of the sector, the effects of regulation are also influenced and 
possibly undermined by firm strategies outside the regulated realm. Consequently, 
good policy needs to take its effects on both regulated and unregulated stakeholders 
as well as any feedbacks into account. Some interdependencies among participants 
in the ICT ecosystem are organized and internalized in market transactions but oth-
ers are true externalities and public goods. Aspects of this are recognized in a lively 
literature on platform markets. Going back to early attempts beginning in the 1970s, 
the economic literature on multi-side markets greatly expanded in the past fifteen 
years. Although definitions vary, platforms are generally seen as firms that enable 
transactions among third parties. Parts of the literature focus on the role of technical 
platforms as enablers of complementary technologies and services (Gawer & Cusu-
mano, 2002) while others emphasize the role of platforms to help reduce transaction 
costs and internalize externalities and thus reducing barriers to economic transac-
tions (Armstrong, 2006; Evans, 2012; Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; 
Rysman, 2009; Spulber, 2006). A recurring conclusion from this literature is that the 
design of public policy needs to look at the entire web of economic relations and not 
just one side of a market to avoid erroneous decisions (Bauer, 2013). Hence, when 
diagnosing market power and setting prices, a broader analysis than is currently 
performed is required. Some of these insights have been adapted in efforts to design 
better regulatory policies (Ballon & Heesvelde, 2011; Claffy & Clark, 2013).
 The research on platform markets allows designing better regulatory ap-
proaches but in some ways it does not go far enough. For one, it does not take spill-
over effects into account that are not reflected in market transactions. There is ev-
idence that such public and quasi-public good effects are pervasive (Frischmann, 
2012; Greenstein, 2011; Hogendorn, 2012). Moreover, in the ICT system, regulatory 
interventions typically affect players in differential ways, leading to cascading posi-
tive and negative feedback effects. At a very abstract level, new tools emerging from 
network science have started to pay direct attention to such forms of interdependen-
cies among players (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010). Several authors also have suggested 
that notions from innovation economics or the theory of complex adaptive systems 
can help provide an appropriate framework (Atkinson & Ezell, 2012; Cherry, 2007; 
Whitt & Schultze, 2009). Although some of these concepts enjoy increasing traction, 
they have not yet been employed to develop a systematic instrumental theory of 
network governance in which the potential direct and indirect effects of intervention 
are systematically examined and taken into account. However, there is a growing 
literature that is aware of potentially contradictory effects and the need to examine 
the net effects of policy at an aggregate level (Bauer, 2010b; Bourreau, Cambini, & 
Hoernig, 2012; Cambini & Silvestri, 2012). Because these net effects are dependent on 
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the local and regional context, one policy may not be the best solution across a larger 
region such as the EU or the US. Geographically differentiated approaches may be 
better able to respond to these contextual factors (Belloc et al., 2012).
 This leads to a third challenge of governing dynamic socio technical systems: 
the need to adapt forms and instruments of governance in response to system states. 
Such adaptation is needed because the effects of interventions on the performance 
of dynamic systems are typically not known with certainty. Often, they occur in the 
form of emergent properties that can only be observed ex post. Good regulation 
therefore has to monitor the important state variables and change in response to the 
observed states (Cherry & Bauer, 2004). Compared to legislation, regulation is a more 
adaptive institutional approach to governance. Nonetheless, over time, regulation 
like many other institutions is prone to red tape and other forms of rigidity. This 
may include organizational routines that cannot be changed easily, a growing body 
of case law and precedent that constrains subsequent decisions and may be diffi-
cult to overrule, experts trained in a certain way, and stakeholders who benefit from 
maintaining the status quo. The European model seeks to mitigate these effects with 
periodic reviews of the overall approach but it is not immune to all of these effects. 
One could hypothesize that problems related to rigidity increase with the age of the 
regulatory system, as more stakeholders participate, their positions become more 
difficult to reconcile, and the initial drive of a regulatory agency to contribute to the 
public good may give way to more routinized behavior and loss of vigor (Melody, 
2013). However, even though regulation may experience a life cycle, it is possible to 
rejuvenate agencies and adapt, as demonstrated in countries that have changed the 
organizational setup of regulation (e.g., the UK) or streamlined practices (Goldberg, 
1976; Martimort, 1999). 
 Such periodic transformations might be facilitated if the widespread (of-
ten tacit) assumption that regulation is costless and efficient were abandoned. One 
could look at this working assumption as a modern version of the “public interest” 
theory of regulation or the related notion that regulation is intended to increase 
welfare, a more narrowly construed economic criterion (Bozeman, 2007; Joskow & 
Noll, 1981; Kahn, 1970/71). The notion that regulation is mainly designed with such 
goals in mind has been widely challenged by political-economic theories of regu-
lation since the 1940s (Wilson, 1980). As a theoretical abstraction, the assumption 
of costless regulation to enhance welfare may be justifiable. However, it becomes a 
problem when policy recommendations are directly derived from a formal model 
based on the premise. A pragmatic and practical theory of regulation would need to 
take several types of costs into account. One source of costs that has received most 
attention is problems associated with asymmetric and incomplete information. An-
other source is the fact that regulation takes place in an institutional environment 
that imposes certain feasibility constraints (e.g., certain procedural and majority 
requirements) and hence costs of changing existing arrangements. 
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 Taken together, these arguments suggest that much of current regulatory 
theory and practice must be considered as a special case of a more general approach 
to governing a dynamic adaptive system. We will explore the implications of this 
insight for a forward-looking European approach in the next section.
5. A REASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN ELECTRON-
IC COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
 In the light of the previous sections the European experience can be reas-
sessed and reconstructed. A nuanced interpretation requires looking at the nation-
al and European levels. The overall reform process has contributed to remarkable 
improvements in sector performance since the 1980s as measured in diffusion rates 
of advanced ICT and other achievements of the sector. By the 1970s, there was a 
widespread sense that the state monopoly model had run its course and could not 
be reformed to meet the needs of users under the conditions of rapidly evolving 
technology. The blueprint adopted by the EU of liberalization and independent reg-
ulation allowed realizing great efficiency gains and unleashed innovation. Likewise, 
the application of traditional regulatory theory and practices facilitated the entrance 
of new players in fixed networks. Unbundling policies, adopted beginning in 1999, 
bolstered the diffusion of first generation broadband services, based mostly on the 
network of incumbent service providers. The combination of independent regulation 
and industrial policy bore unanticipated fruits, especially in digital mobile commu-
nications, where the GSM system advanced to a global standard. European author-
ities and NRAs measured their success largely by the increases in adoption and the 
decreases in consumer prices. For many years steady performance improvements 
could be achieved by this combination of policies.
 However, as the sector further evolved, new unanticipated challenges arose. 
The roots of many of these issues can be found in forms of path dependence (Bel-
loc et al., 2013; J. Cave, 2009). During the early days of mobile communications the 
EU member states insisted that spectrum management remain a national issue. Al-
though this was workable for 2G mobile, it arguably turned into a disadvantage in 
the transition to 3G mobile services, where licenses were awarded in spectrum auc-
tions. One unanticipated side effect was the pursuit of national licensing timetables 
and approaches rather than regional or even pan-European approaches. On the one 
hand, this led initially to astronomical prices paid for spectrum. While later auctions 
did not achieve similarly high prices, the financial burden, contrary to what some 
mainstream economists argued, delayed the introduction of 3G mobile and later 4G 
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mobile. Another repercussion of the success of GSM was that it seems to have shaped 
expectations that the same model could be applied to the next generation of mobile 
Internet services. Alas, 3G was based on a very different value network of players, 
requiring more than an integrating technical standard (UMTS. The coordination 
among the players did not come forth in the European (or the US) market for a long 
time, giving Japan and South Korea an opportunity to move ahead.
 A similar negative effect of earlier decisions affected the further evolution 
of fixed broadband markets. The prolongation of ex ante regulation in advanced 
broadband eventually also was written into the European framework for next-gen-
eration networks, although in a somewhat weakened form (M. E. Cave & Shortall, 
2011; EC, 2010). During prolonged negotiations, stakeholder positions hardened 
and became increasingly irreconcilable. New entrants, represented by the Euro-
pean Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA) lobbied for continued 
policies that favored their members and the association of incumbent players, the 
European Telecommunications Network Operator Association (ETNO) for relaxed 
forms of regulation. The latter position was that overly stringent regulation, contrib-
uting to low consumer prices and easy entry for competitors, had thus suppressed 
the incentive to invest in next-generation networks. ECTA and its consultants ar-
gued that the economies of scale for next-generation networks would only supply 
one or a few dominant suppliers in all but the largest urban markets. Both positions 
contain a kernel of truth but both are also heavily influenced by the strategic po-
sitions of the stakeholders. In the end, by the time the EU adopted a compromise 
policy, the window of opportunity to allow more competitive market organization 
in next-generation networks was closed. 
 The lack of investment in next-generation network infrastructure continues 
to be a serious problem in many of its member states. The European Investment 
Bank estimates that achieving universal deployment of high-speed networks that 
support download speeds of 50-100 mpbs would require investment expenses of 
about Euro 250-280 billion (Gruber, 2010). At the current pace of market-driven in-
vestment, the EU is not likely to reach this goal by private sector investment. There 
are several paths forward: 1) reliance on public sector investment, 2) public-private 
partnerships, (3) new forms of universal service programs, (4) relaxed regulation 
and rejuvenation of market forces, and (5) combinations of 1)-(4. Given the state of 
public finances, it is unlikely that the gap left by private investment can be closed 
by public initiatives alone. Although public-private partnerships have worked in 
limited circumstances, there is a long track record of projects that failed at the ex-
pense of tax payers, so that this may not be a panacea to overcome the investment 
shortfall (Melody, 2013). Policies in this realm also have to be compatible with the 
European regulations for state aid. Often, these regulations constrain innovative 
public sector policy interventions (Gomez-Barroso & Feijoo, 2012). A third option 
would be to devise universal service programs in which limited public sector fund-
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ing and subsidies are leveraged to improve the viability of private investment. Thus 
far, the EU has been reluctant to introduce broadband universal service measures, 
in part because one of its self-imposed preconditions for such programs is that a 
service has been adopted widely (Bohlin & Teppayayon, 2009). This approach does, 
to some degree backfire in situations where the goal is to accelerate network de-
ployment and not just to fix limited forms of market failure. 
 A fourth strategy is to adapt the regulatory framework to reenergize compet-
itive forces. There are several options how this can be done, some with less and some 
with more government prodding. An approach inspired by limited government in-
tervention would be to relax regulations that potentially depress investment and in-
novation to promote risk taking by private entrepreneurs. This could be achieved 
with a combination of relaxed access and price regulation (e.g., for termination) com-
bined with a policy of making access to civil engineering infrastructure more easily 
available Compared to the status quo ante, this alternative would likely create win-
ners and losers both on the supply and demand side and would face strong political 
resistance. However, given the technological and market dynamics of the ICT sector, 
this may be an attractive option going forward. It would also require regulators to 
be comfortable with letting go of a slew of controls and detailed regulations that are 
currently in place. As such measures would likely result in restructuring of prices, 
both by adding more expensive and less expensive user options, this policy might 
also generate concerns about consumer welfare and some backlash from users, even 
though it might be welfare enhancing overall (Bauer & Wildman, 2012). A policy of 
less regulation may have the undesirable side-effect that open network architectures 
that drove the Internet may be replaced by private IP network environments that al-
low better configuration of quality of service and price differentiation but also gener-
ate additional transaction costs for independent third parties (Claffy & Clark, 2013).
 
 Competitive forces could also be stimulated with policies that rely more 
strongly on government intervention. These are squarely in the tradition of pro-com-
petitive regulation that has dominated past European policy design. In that sense, 
they are more compatible with existing practices but they also share many of the 
shortcomings discussed in section three. One model that has been implemented in a 
few countries is structural separation between the network and services (e.g., Open 
Reach in the UK) or forms of functional separation (e.g. in Sweden) (Teppayayon & 
Bohlin, 2011). These options are feasible as long as certain incentive problems are 
overcome. One challenge is the design of the economic incentives to deploy net-
works. Here, some form of regulated pricing and earnings, despite the critique that 
led to the demise of these forms of regulation, would allow aligning the incentives of 
investors and users. Moreover, it would be possible to impose a universal service and 
common carriage mandate on networks within a framework of coherent economic 
incentives. A second challenge is the coordination between the players in higher lay-
ers and the providers of network infrastructure. As advanced communication servic-
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es are becoming more complex, it may be increasingly difficult to orchestrate such co-
ordination through markets (M. E. Cave, 2006). This can lead to a mismatch between 
the needs of application and service providers and investors in network services. 
Vertical integration can help mitigate these incentive issues so that there is a trade-off 
between the clarity of the regulatory system and allowing conditions that support 
dynamic innovation and investment dynamics of advanced communications. 
 Not all member states experienced a similar fate, though. Countries such as 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark with high problem solving capacity were 
able to design innovative programs of public-private sector collaboration, often in-
cluding municipalities that boosted rolling out fiber networks. Although not an EU 
member, Switzerland allowed collaboration between local utilities and Swisscom 
in the deployment of local access networks, elevating its broadband penetration to 
reach a global leadership position (OECD, 2013). Other countries, such as Austria, 
benefited from the presence of an aggressive competitor with an ambitious mobile 
broadband deployment strategy. These are all signs of the working of the ICT ecosys-
tem and the ability of innovative solutions or of competition to emerge in unexpected 
places. Such national success stories suggest that the EU would be well-advised to 
allow more national experimentation as a regional learning process can be set in 
motion. As discussed above, from an evolutionary institutional perspective, some 
level of diversity and heterogeneity may be desirable, although it has to be traded off 
against increased transaction costs of differentiated regulatory regimes. 
 This leads to one of the persistent puzzles of European electronic communica-
tions reform. Despite decades of regional coordination and integration, no integrated 
European communications market emerged. One of the goals of the reforms during 
the 1980s, to overcome the “patchwork Europe”, remains as relevant today as part 
of the Digital Agenda 2020.  Looking back it is possible to identify several factors at 
play. One is the cultural and political heterogeneity of Europe that requires targeting 
a business strategy to national and sub-national markets. The continued national or-
ganization is reinforced by different national sector organization ranging from pow-
erful national monopolies in Germany and France to more decentralized organiza-
tion in Spain and Italy. These factors contributed to the establishment of a regulatory 
system with a strong role for national regulatory authorities. Even though European 
rules homogenize and synchronized national rules, the presence of 28 NRAs adds 
a strong spatial structure to markets. Even small initial deviations in regulatory ap-
proaches and timelines of reform will provide an additional reason for suppliers 
to look at each national market separately. This has been particularly visible in the 
area of spectrum management, rules for rights of way management, and the will-
ingness to adopt universal broadband service policies. Establishment of a European 
regulatory agency could have counteracted some of these trends but was rejected 
several times.  Last but not least, the continued interest of the state as part-owner 
and operator in some countries combined with strong sentiments in favor of national 
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control of critical infrastructures have undermined a process of European industry 
consolidation that might have helped overcome national fragmentation. The paucity 
of pan-European service providers is particularly detrimental to businesses looking 
for one-stop shopping for their communication needs (Godlovitch, Monti, Schäfer, & 
Stumpf, 2013).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 European electronic communications reform can best be understood by ana-
lyzing the interplay of national and European levels. A handful of European nations, 
including Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, have historically been among the top per-
formers in the world. As a an economic region, the member states of the European 
Union, either delineated as the EU-15 or the enlarged EU-28, historically lagged be-
hind international peer regions, especially the US (and during the past decades a 
few leading Asian countries. However, within less than a dozen years, beginning in 
the late 1980s, European electronic communications was radically transformed from 
nearly a century of state monopoly to an environment of regulated competition. In the 
course of these reforms, the region was able to close the historical performance deficit 
that had prevailed for much of the twentieth century. The adopted model of liberal-
ization combined with independent sector regulation was an appropriate response 
to the technological and economic conditions of the industry as well as the political 
conditions at the time. It facilitated rapid diffusion of services, entrants of new play-
ers and the associated innovations, and declining process, all integrated in a virtuous 
cycle of efficiency gains and growth. 
 After 25 years of reforms, several new challenges need to be confronted. Some 
are beyond the control of national and European policy makers. Fundamental shifts 
in global value generation have shifted important economic activities to low and mid-
dle-income countries. Advanced ICT has facilitated these shifts and hence increased 
the pressure to develop employment opportunities in high-tech industries heavily re-
liant on advanced communications. At the same time, these technologies offer a high-
ly plastic and malleable production technology in which products and services can be 
generated with multiple alternative processes (e.g., video service can be configured 
via cable TV, satellite, P2P streaming, content delivery networks-CDNs, etc.), gener-
ating enormous competitive pressure and tumultuous market conditions in which 
sustained and high investment in infrastructure networks is difficult to sustain. Many 
of the digital technologies also allow a high rate of substitution of human capital by 
machine capital, thus creating significant strain on jobs and employment. Moreover, 
they go hand in hand with a process of de-monetization of services and a severe 
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redistribution of income to technologically savvy risk takers. European policy, like 
policy elsewhere, will have to find new responses to these challenges but it is difficult 
to see how the big agendas (e.g., the Digital Agenda 2020 or the American Agenda for 
American Innovation) can be effective responses to these global tidal forces.
 Other challenges originate in the need to adapt the existing framework to the 
new economics and technological conditions within the ICT sector. Here the Europe-
an framework has, at least in some areas, turned into a legacy that is in the way of the 
massive network investment needed in the coming decade. In an international com-
parison, such periods of transition between an old regime of regulation and a new one 
are visible periodically and they need to be expected. As the EU seeks for innovative 
solutions going forward, it will be important to design regulatory frameworks and 
practices that are more attuned with the dynamic adaptive system characteristics of 
advanced communication systems.
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